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Representational Momentum in the 
Expertise Context: Support for the 
Theory of Event Coding as an 
Explanation for Action Anticipation
Dior N. Anderson, Victoria M. Gottwald and Gavin P. Lawrence*
School of Sport, Health and Exercise Sciences, Institute for the Psychology of Elite Performance, Bangor University, Bangor, 
United Kingdom
This study aimed to extend the notion of the theory of event coding as an explanation of 
action anticipation in expert sport performers. This was achieved by investigating the 
degree with which automatic anticipation depends on the ecological congruency between 
the perceived action and its distal effect. In a novel approach, the representational 
momentum paradigm was adopted to address this notion. Expert (N = 16) and novice 
(N = 20) rugby players observed a dynamic video of a short pass that was displayed as 
either toward or away from a receiver. Following an occlusion interval, participants were 
required to judge whether the video resumed at the same place, further forward or further 
backward than its original stopping place. Experts demonstrated stronger anticipatory 
tendencies when the action was directed toward the receiver. This relationship was 
modulated by a leftward directional bias that is discussed in the context of a bias in viewing 
behavior that is underpinned by attention. Novice anticipatory tendencies were independent 
of context. These findings show support for the extension of the theory of event coding.
Keywords: representational momentum, expertise, action anticipation, theory of event coding, rugby
INTRODUCTION
Conventional accounts of motor control theory have linked the afferent-efferent coding of 
motor actions to that of their respective outcomes (Adams, 1971; Schmidt, 1975; Prinz, 1997; 
Hommel et  al., 2001). Indeed, strong associations between the quality of motor actions and 
their respective effects characterize sporting expertise. Research has demonstrated that, compared 
to novices, expert sport performers demonstrate superior ability in the planning and execution 
of actions in relation to their distal effects (e.g., Ford et  al., 2006). Accordingly, experts find 
themselves exposed to competitive scenarios in which the successful anticipation of another 
performer’s action is paramount for successful performance (Williams, 2009). In the current 
study, the researchers investigated the extent that the superior ability demonstrated by experts 
is dependent on the ecological congruency between the observed action and its anticipated effect.
Hommel et al. (2001) proposed the theory of event coding (TEC). The TEC offers a framework 
for the cognitive underpinnings of action planning and perception and could serve as a sound 
explanation for anticipatory behavior of expert performers. The TEC proposes that overlapping 
features in sensorimotor representations reflect the common coding of both actions and their 
perceived distal effect; when it comes to action planning, it means that once such action-effect 
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binding has occurred, one only has to anticipate the effect to 
trigger the execution of the associated action (Hommel et  al., 
2001). Accordingly, supporting evidence for the TEC also 
suggests that experience in action planning facilitates the tendency 
to anticipate similar actions of others toward distal effects when 
these actions are congruent with those previously learned 
(Knoblich and Flach, 2001; Wilson and Knoblich, 2005; Prinz, 
2006). This suggests that experts acquired a form of anticipatory 
behavior that is developed as a function of action planning 
experience, a notion which has been frequently observed in 
paradigms that have reported expert-novice differences in 
anticipatory behavior across a variety of sporting expertise 
domains (Cañal-Bruland et  al., 2011; Vicario et  al., 2017; 
Murphy et  al., 2018).
In light of this, one can assume that for anticipation of an 
action to occur, features in the observer’s visual field must 
be  congruent with the ecological features of the action, such 
that a likely distal effect in the environment can be  commonly 
coded with the action as it is observed. These features could 
take the form of appropriate physical space in the direction 
of action, or the presence of a landmark, such as a receiving 
actor or a contextually relevant target. Conversely, under 
conditions in which the features that the observer perceives 
are incongruent with the ecological features of the action, 
(according to the premise of the TEC) anticipation of the 
action would likely be  compromised. This study aimed to test 
this proposition by comparing the anticipatory behavior of 
experts in response to observing an action that is performed 
with an ecologically congruent landmark in the observer’s visual 
field versus an action that is ecologically incongruent with the 
visual field landmark. To test for the effect of expertise, we also 
observed the anticipatory behavior of novices in response to 
the same set of stimuli.
A measure of automatic anticipatory behavior that is widely 
used in the perception literature stems from the representational 
momentum (RM) phenomenon (see Hubbard, 2014 for a 
review). RM describes the local, bottom-up nature of motion 
perception and is defined as the tendency to extrapolate the 
position of an object beyond that last observed. In Freyd and 
Finke’s (1984) original paradigm, participants were required 
to view a sequence of three images of a rectangle, each image 
indicating an implicit direction of the rectangle’s rotation. 
Participants were instructed to remember the orientation of 
the third rectangle prior to the presentation of a fourth that 
was either in the same position as the third, rotated in the 
implicit direction, or rotated in the reverse direction. When 
the inducing sequence implied a consistent direction of motion, 
participants declared the position of the fourth rectangle as 
being in the same position as the third rectangle when it had 
actually moved forward. This finding suggested that participants 
extrapolated the position of the third rectangle beyond that 
induced by the display sequence, demonstrating the RM effect.
The RM effect has received widespread empirical support 
across a range of experimental stimuli, such as apparent motion 
in static images (Senior et al., 2000), smooth continuous vertical 
and horizontal motion (Hubbard and Bharucha, 1988; Gottwald 
et  al., 2015), biological motion (Verfaillie and Daems, 2002; 
Wilson et  al., 2010), and motion-induced real-world scenes 
from the first-person view (Thornton and Hayes, 2004; Blättler 
et  al., 2010, 2011). Of particular interest to the current study 
is the modulating role that sporting expertise plays in the 
underlying memory distortions associated with the RM effect. 
Specifically, expectations derived from an observer’s domain 
of sporting expertise have been shown to influence the RM 
effect (Didierjean and Marmèche, 2005; Gorman et  al., 2011). 
For example, Gorman et  al. (2011) investigated the influence 
of sporting expertise on complex pattern recall using the RM 
paradigm. Expert and novice basketball players observed an 
inducing display of a complex basketball scene and were asked 
to recall the position of its interrelated elements after a brief 
interval. Findings showed that although both groups 
demonstrated the RM effect when the display contained motion, 
only the experts demonstrated increased anticipatory tendencies 
for the static images. The authors attributed these findings to 
a deeper understanding of the associations between the elements 
in the display within the expert players.
In light of previous findings, the current aim was to further 
explore the proposed common coding of actions and their 
distal effects (as outlined by the TEC) in the context of automatic 
action anticipation. Specifically, this study observed the extent 
with which expertise in rugby elicited the RM effect when 
observing a domain-specific motor action that was either 
ecologically congruent (i.e., directed toward a typically expected 
outcome) or ecologically incongruent (i.e., directed away from 
a typically expected outcome). Novice and expert rugby players 
observed the initiation of the short pass, orientated either 
toward (congruent) or away (incongruent) from a receiver. 
After a short occlusion interval, the display then re-appeared 
at one of several test frame positions that either induced 
reversed, forward, or no momentum displacement. Participants 
were required to make judgments as to whether they perceived 
the test frame position as being shifted backward, forward, or 
in the same position as the last frame prior to the 
occlusion interval.
We hypothesized that expert participants would have 
developed a strong encoding of action-effect relationships, and 
therefore expected them to produce stronger memory distortions 
when the observed action was directed toward a receiving 
player. When the short pass was directed away from the receiver, 
however, it was expected that experts would not demonstrate 
anticipatory tendencies, and thus memory distortions in this 
condition would not occur. In contrast, we  did not expect 
novices to have acquired the same action-effect encoding, and 
thus we  did not expect any anticipatory tendencies observed 
to be  influenced by ecological validity, and therefore expected 
memory distortions not to interact with the congruency of 
actions directed either toward or away from the receiver.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Expert (N  =  16; mean age 22.61  ±  1.67  years) and novice 
rugby players (N  =  20; mean age 21.42  ±  2.12  years) provided 
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informed consent to participate in the study. All were naïve 
to the research hypotheses being tested. Procedures were carried 
out in accordance with the ethical guidelines outlined by the 
Ethics Committee of the School of Sport, Health and Exercise 
Sciences, Bangor University for research involving human 
participants and in line with the 1964 Helsinki declaration 
and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. 
Participants were classified into their respective expertise groups 
according to number of years playing rugby and time currently 
spent training and competing on a weekly basis. As such, the 
expert group had accumulated an average of 7.30  ±  3.52  years 
of rugby-specific playing experience at amateur club level, and 
were all currently training and competing for 5.46  ±  4.51  h 
per week. Conversely, the novice group had accumulated an 
average of 0.16  ±  0.53  years playing experience, and none 
were currently training or competing in rugby.
Apparatus
The video was recorded using a Basler™ high-speed camera 
(160 frames per second). During recording, the passer was 
instructed to execute a simple pass to his right toward the 
receiver, with the pass executed over a distance of 2  m. The 
video was then broken down forming 100 separate frame-by-
frame images of both the passer and the receiver. Each frame 
was edited using DirectDraw 7™ software in which passer and 
receiver images were mirrored to simulate the apparent motion 
of the action being performed in either rightward or leftward 
directions. Each frame was then pieced back together to simulate 
the display video sequence (see Figure 1) using Visual Basic 
6™ software running at a refresh rate of 85  Hz. Four separate 
sequences were created to simulate the passer initiating the 
pass either toward or away from the receiver in both directions. 
The display was presented on a DELL™ Trinitron UltraScan 
P991 monitor (85 Hz) with a 1,600 × 1,200 resolution running 
from a desktop computer (Compusys Computers Ltd. Core 2 
Duo 3 GHz, 2 GB RAM, ATI 128 MB Graphics card, Windows 
XP operating system). Participants sat at a distance of 1  m 
from the monitor with their head fixed on a chin rest in 
order to ensure the participants maintained their viewing 
position and visual angle. A response keypad with three active 
keys (1  =  same, 2  =  forward, 3  =  reverse) was connected to 
the computer in order for the experimenter to register the 
participants’ verbal response for each trial.
Task and Procedure
For each trial, participants were presented with the video 
representing the initiation of the short pass orientated either 
toward (congruent) or away (incongruent) from a receiver 
(see Figure 1). This video lasted approximately 850  ms prior 
to disappearing for an occlusion interval of 250  ms. This 
occlusion interval is in line with previous RM paradigms 
(e.g., Wilson et  al., 2010) and was chosen to preserve the 
RM effect, which has been shown to decay after a few 
hundred milliseconds (Freyd and Johnson, 1987; Bertamini, 
1993). To prevent participants from memorizing the position 
of the final frame in the sequence, half of the trials disappeared 
at the 99th frame in the video, and the other half at the 
100th frame. The display then re-appeared at one of the 
five test frame positions indicating different temporal shifts 
in the display sequence corresponding to the displacement 
momentum and the number of frames displaced (i.e., −24, −12, 0, 
+12, +24  ms; with each frame shift representing a 12-ms 
temporal shift). On presentation of the test frame, participants 
were asked to verbally respond to whether they perceived 
the test frame position as shifted forward, backward, or in 
the same position as the last frame prior to the occlusion 
interval. The experimenter, who was blind to the presentation 
of the stimulus, then documented the participant’s verbal 
FIGURE 1 | A schematic representation of a trial in the leftward “away” condition. Both the passer and receiver appeared at the same time in the initial frame. The 
sequence then displays the series of images depicting the passer performing the action either toward or away from the receiver for 850 ms to the position of the last 
frame prior to disappearing for an occlusion interval of 250 ms and then re-appearing at one of five test frames.
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response onto the computer via the response keypad. 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately 
as possible in order to ensure the responses were based on 
the first impression of the stimulus. This was especially 
important as the RM effect is a measure of automatic 
anticipation, which has been shown to decay with longer 
response times. The testing phase consisted of 240 trials 
{six random repetitions of each of the possible 40 trial 
combinations [2 conditions (toward, away) × 2 directions 
(leftward, rightward) × 2 last frame positions (99th, 100th) × 
5 test frame positions]}.
Dependent Measures and Analyses
Weighted Means
To attain a measure of the RM effect, we calculated an adapted 
version of the weighted means as used in many RM paradigms 
(e.g., Munger, 2015). Specifically, the proportion of “same” 
responses at each test frame position was subtracted from the 
relative point of maximum uncertainty and was then summed 
across all test frame positions. The relative point of maximum 
uncertainty was determined as the rate at which a given response 
would indicate uncertainty about the position of a test frame. 
This was expected to be  equally distributed for each response 
for the 0-ms test frame (i.e., 1/3 responses = 0.33 for “forward,” 
“same,” and “reverse” responses), and disproportionately 
distributed in all other test frame positions as a function of 
the product of the number of potential responses [i.e., 3 
(“forward,” “same,” or “reverse”)] and the number of frames 
the test frame had shifted from the final position of the video. 
For example, the point of maximum uncertainty for “same” 
responses in the +24-ms test frame (i.e., +2 frames) would 
be  1/(3 responses × 2 frame shifts)  =  0.17. See Figure 2 for 
a breakdown of a case example.
The proportion of response rates at each test frame was 
subtracted from its relative point of maximum uncertainty, 
multiplied by a position weight of −1, 0, or 1 (for respective 
reversed, same, or forward test frames), and then summed to 
produce a weighted value. A positive value would indicate that 
the test frames that had actually shifted forward (i.e., the +12-ms 
and  +24-ms test frames) were incorrectly identified as “same,” 
therefore indicating the presence of the RM effect. In order 
to appropriately weigh this value for each condition, we divided 
this summed value for each participant in each condition by 
the mean of the overall summed value for all participants 
across all conditions. These values were then subjected to a 
2 (group: experts, novices) × 2 (condition: toward, away) × 
2 (direction: left, right) mixed model ANOVA.
Response Error
To assess the overall accuracy of the responses, and thus the 
perceptual sensitivity within participants, we  recorded the 
percentage of incorrect responses at each test position and 
subjected mean values to a 2 (group) × 2 (condition) × 2 
(direction) × 5 (test frame) position ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last factor. Sphericity corrections were applied 
to the model using the Greenhouse Geiser adjustment.
RESULTS
Weighted Means
The ANOVA revealed non-significant main effects for group 
(F1,35  =  0.11, p  =  0.74, hG2   =  0.00), condition (F1,35  =  0.11, 
p  =  0.75, hG2   =  0.00), and direction (F1,35  =  2.25, p  =  0.14, 
hG2   =  0.01). However, a significant group × condition × 
direction interaction was observed (F1,35  =  8.99, p  <  0.01, 
hG2   =  0.01). Breakdown of this interaction via separate 2 
(group) × 2 (condition) ANOVAs for each direction revealed 
a group × condition interaction when the stimulus was directed 
to the observer’s left (F1,35  =  8.63, p  <  0.01, hG2   =  0.03; see 
Figure 3), but not the observer’s right (F1,35  =  1.60, p  =  0.21, 
hG2   =  0.00; see Figure 4). Post hoc inspection using Tukey’s 
HSD revealed that while novices observed an RM effect in 
both the congruent (toward) and incongruent (away) conditions, 
experts produced significantly greater RM effects (higher weighted 
mean values) in the congruent compared to incongruent 
conditions (t15  =  1.75, p  <  0.05, d  =  0.36) in the leftward 
direction. Additionally, the weighted mean value significantly 
differed from 0 for experts in the congruent condition only 
(t15  =  2.69, p  <  0.01, d  =  0.86; see Table 1).
The data here present a rather unexpected finding: the 
expertise-induced RM effect seemingly operated as a function 
of a directional bias, specifically a leftward bias. Expert rugby 
players were able to extrapolate, and thus anticipate, the 
movement of the passing player beyond its last observed position 
when the pass was congruent (i.e., directed toward the receiver), 
but only when this action occurred to the left. When the pass 
was incongruent by being directed away from the receiver or 
was directed rightward, experts were able to more accurately 
recall the movement of the passing player, and thus did not 
FIGURE 2 | A case example of the distribution of the proportion of “same” 
responses across each test frame position. The dashed lines represent the 
point of maximum uncertainty for the “same” responses at each test frame 
position (note the respective decrease in the point of maximum uncertainty at 
the two extreme test positions. This would indicate a reduced threshold for 
uncertainty, or an increased expectation that participants will be more certain 
about their response in these test frame positions).
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demonstrate any anticipatory behavior. Novices did not appear 
to differentiate the congruency of context since they demonstrated 
memory extrapolations independent of the pass being directed 
toward or away from the receiver.
Response Error
Data for leftward and rightward direction stimuli are presented 
in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. As expected, the analysis revealed 
a main effect for test frame position (F4,128 = 21.718, p < 0.001, 
hG2   =  0.22), with the error rate at test position −24  ms being 
significantly lower than all other test positions (M  =  0.27, 
S  =  0.29; relative to test frame 0  ms: t135  =  −4.113, p  <  0.001, 
d  =  0.47), and the error rate at test position +12  ms being 
significantly higher than all other test positions (M  =  0.69, 
S  =  0.25; relative to test frame 0  ms: t135  =  9.759, p  <  0.001, 
d  =  1.14). A test frame position × condition interaction was 
also observed (F4, 128  =  3.441, p  <  0.05, hG2   =  0.007), with 
error rates in the congruent condition (M  =  0.75, S  =  0.23) 
being higher than the incongruent condition (M = 0.63, S = 0.25) 
at test frame position +12  ms (t67  =  4.311, p  <  0.001, d  =  0.5). 
Finally, a significant group × direction × condition × test 
frame position interaction was observed (F4,128 = 3.548, p < 0.05, 
hG2   =  0.009). Breakdown revealed that error rates in the 
incongruent condition at test frame position 0  ms were 
significantly lower for experts (M  =  0.26, S  =  0.25) compared 
to novices (M = 0.51, S = 0.21) (t66 = −2.44, p < 0.01, d = 1.09; 
see Table 3). In the congruent condition, error rates were 
lower at test frame +24  ms for experts (M  =  0.29, S  =  0.25) 
compared to novices (M  =  0.60, S  =  0.31) (t66  =  −3.277, 
p  <  0.01, d  =  1.03). This finding is an interesting one, and 
suggests that experts were more sensitive to the positioning 
of the test frame relative to its last observed position than 
novices, and that this sensitivity seemingly operated at different 
test frame positions, depending on the orientation and direction 
of the observed action. It appeared that, when the pass was 
directed rightward and away from the receiver, experts 
demonstrated the tendency to more accurately recall the test 
frame position. However, when the pass was directed rightward 
and toward the receiver, experts demonstrated an increased 
sensitivity to the test frame position compared to novices.
DISCUSSION
The current study aimed to investigate the extent with which 
the anticipation of an observed action is dependent on the 
ecological congruency between the observed action and its 





FIGURE 3 | Results for the leftward direction. The left-hand side of the figure displays the distribution of the proportion of “same” responses across test frame 
positions for (A) experts and (C) novices. The right-hand side displays the weighted means for (B) experts and (D) novices. * indicates significant difference from 
“away” condition at p < 0.05.
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of domain-specific practice, expert performers would show 
increased automatic anticipation when observing a domain-specific 
action that was directed toward an ecologically congruent outcome 
(in the current experiment, a pass that was directed toward a 
team mate). Conversely, when the movement was directed away 
from its ecologically congruent outcome (a pass directed away 
from a teammate), automatic anticipation would not occur. Novices, 
(individuals who have not acquired these action-effect relationships) 
were hypothesized to have anticipatory responses independent 
of the ecological congruency of outcomes. The findings support 
our hypothesis since experts demonstrated anticipatory tendencies 
when observing a sport-specific action that was directed toward 
an ecologically congruent outcome. Moreover, when the action 
was directed away from its ecologically valid outcome, experts 
no longer extrapolated the action toward its distal effect, and 
thus anticipatory tendencies did not occur. Conversely, the novices 
did not appear to be influenced by these action-effect relationships, 
since their anticipatory behavior occurred independent of 
congruency, i.e., whether the pass was directed toward (congruent) 
or away (incongruent) from the receiver.
The notion of common coding of action and effects (or 
the TEC) has also been demonstrated empirically by Jordan 
and Hunsinger (2008). In a series of experiments, participants 
were provided with the opportunity to practice a visual tracking 
task before observing the same task being performed by another 





FIGURE 4 | Results for the rightward direction. The left-hand side of the figure displays the distribution of the proportion of “same” responses across test frame 
positions for (A) experts and (C) novices. The right-hand side displays the weighted means for (B) experts and (D) novices.
TABLE 1 | Weighted means (and standard deviations) for each group in each 
experimental condition. Bold font values indicate expert values that are 
significantly different from respective novice values.
Leftward Rightward
Toward Away Toward Away
Novices 0.83 (1.90) 1.58 (1.92) 1.09 (2.24) 0.64 (2.01)
Experts 1.45 (1.69) 0.81 (1.82) 0.84 (1.76) 0.71 (1.31)
TABLE 2 | Response error rates (and standard deviations) for each group in 
each test frame position in the leftward direction.
Leftward
Test frame position
−24 ms −12 ms 0 ms +12 ms +24 ms
Toward
 Novices 30.0 (34.0) 51.7 (0.28) 43.3 (28.3) 72.5 (23.7) 47.5 (24.9)
 Experts 20.2 (28.6) 36.9 (32.1) 35.7 (28.3) 83.3 (17.2) 34.5 (28.0)
Away
 Novices 27.5 (27.2) 42.5 (34.4) 42.5 (23.2) 70.8 (19.4) 55.0 (24.8)
 Experts 19.0 (24.3) 42.8 (23.3) 38.1 (28.1) 73.8 (27.5) 32.1 (31.0)
Rates are expressed as a percentage.
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measured via the RM effect, to a group that observed the 
task without acquiring prior action experience. Participants 
who had practiced the task produced greater RM effects than 
the observational group, suggesting that the learned anticipatory 
extrapolation occurred as a result of experiencing the action 
planning process, and thus its associated action-effect relationship. 
It must be noted, however, that the task was limited to observing 
the continuous motion of a stimulus on a computer monitor, 
without additionally processing the physical movements of the 
actor in control of the stimulus. In addition, only half an 
hour of practice was given to participants during the experimental 
phases, making it difficult to interpret in the context of sport 
performance, in which practice is usually acquired over years 
of experience and in which complex actions of other performers 
are observed. The findings of the current study support those 
of Jordan and Hunsinger (2008) and provide additional evidence 
for the TEC extending to the observation of biological motion 
from expert performers who have acquired action experience 
in field-based environments.
The findings reported in the current study are also in 
accordance with studies that have investigated the effect of 
expertise in anticipatory behavior when observing a whole-
body motor task (Jackson et  al., 2006; Aglioti et  al., 2008; 
Sebanz and Shiffrar, 2009). For example, Aglioti et  al. (2008) 
investigated expert novice differences in basketball players 
when observing a free throw shot. They found that experts 
demonstrated superior performance to novices in predicting 
the outcome of the shot. They also found increased motor-
evoked potentials in the forearm and hand of experts when 
observing the basketball video clips, thereby supporting the 
notion of an overlap in action planning and action observation 
as described by the TEC. The findings of the current study 
support this notion of anticipatory behavior in experts by 
showing that the ecological congruency in the visual field of 
the expert must also be  present in order for anticipatory 
behavior to occur. However, unexpectedly this effect was 
dependent on direction of the stimulus/video of the rugby 
passing action. That is, experts showed anticipatory tendencies 
only when the pass was congruent (directed toward the receiver) 
and made in the right to left direction. While this finding 
may be  a spurious result, past research has identified similar 
leftward bias direction effects within RM (Hubbard and Ruppel, 
1999; Ossandon et  al., 2014) with effects attributed to a bias 
in the visuo-spatial hemisphere (Gottwald et  al., 2015) and 
the landmark attraction effect (Hubbard and Ruppel, 1999). 
This landmark attraction effect discerns the salience of a 
physical landmark in the visual field when processing the motion 
of a stimulus (Bryant and Subbiah, 1994). In the present 
study, it is possible given the proposed bias in the visuo-
spatial hemisphere (Gottwald et  al., 2015) that the receiving 
player (i.e., the landmark) was more “noticeable” in the left 
compared to right visual hemisphere resulting in an increase 
in the anticipation of the pass when the receiver was positioned 
in the left visual field (as explained by TEC). This landmark 
attraction effect did not appear to be  present in novices, 
who were seemingly uninfluenced by the position of the 
receiving player.
Results for error rates seem to suggest that experts made 
less error than novices when identifying the test frame position. 
However, this effect of expertise on sensitivity to stimuli 
occurred in combination with the condition and the test 
frame position. That is, experts demonstrated the tendency 
to respond more accurately to the probes that were no different 
to the inducing stimuli (i.e., with “same” responses), but 
only when the probe was directed away from the receiver. 
In contrast, experts were more accurate at recalling the test 
probe position when it had moved further along from the 
last frame of the video (by two frames, or approximately 
24  ms and by responding with “forward”), but only when 
the pass was oriented toward the receiver. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that experts demonstrate an increased 
sensitivity to domain-specific stimuli compared to novices, 
and although they demonstrated anticipatory tendencies, these 
tendencies only occurred in the congruent condition. In the 
incongruent condition, experts showed no evidence of an 
anticipatory response; instead their responses met the demands 
of the task, which in the current study were independent 
of their domain of expertise, i.e., recalling the position of 
an inducing display. This would suggest that, when presented 
with stimuli in real time, the goal-directed systems would 
seemingly override any automatic perceptual systems, and 
this overriding would better operate as a function of domain-
specific practice.
Although the current study reveals some interesting findings, 
there are some limitations. For simplicity, we  restricted the 
stimuli presented in the study to a single action in the expertise 
domain. This stimuli was chosen as it represented an action 
that is performed on the horizontal plane and therefore limits 
any potential confounding effects of perceived external forces 
(such as gravity) on the observed RM effects. This makes it 
difficult to generalize current findings to actions within the 
same domain of expertise that occur in different planes of 
motion, e.g., a kick from hand. This is particularly important 
since visual processing of biological motion is seemingly 
influenced by the translational plane of motion (Wilson et  al., 
2010). In addition, the current methodology did not allow 
the RM effect to be  tested with neutral-stimuli, making 
the RM observations difficult to solely attribute to expertise. 
TABLE 3 | Response error rates (and standard deviations) for each group in 
each test frame position in the rightward direction.
Rightward
Test frame position
−24 ms −12 ms 0 ms +12 ms +24 ms
Toward
 Novices 31.7 (33.2) 43.3 (21.9) 38.3 (26.5) 75.0 (25.0) 60.0 (30.8)
 Experts 27.3 (27.4) 42.9 (26.7) 34.5 (17.9) 72.6 (28.2) 28.6 (24.8)
Away
 Novices 28.3 (32.9) 46.7 (22.0) 50.8 (20.6) 56.7 (27.7) 42.5 (32.2)
 Experts 23.9 (24.2) 33.3 (21.7) 26.2 (25.1) 53.6 (19.8) 30.9 (31.3)
Rates are expressed as a percentage. Bold font indicates Expert values that are 
significantly different from respective Novice values.
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That said, Nakamoto et al. (2015) report that sporting expertise 
does not serve to independently influence neutral stimuli. In 
addition, the complexity of the study design, the number of 
levels in the analyses, and the small effect sizes reported, mean 
results could have occurred by chance alone. However, given 
the effect of expertise on anticipation reported in the literature, 
as well as that of visual field asymmetries on the RM effect 
(c.f., Hubbard and Ruppel, 1999), the findings of the current 
study do not stand out of context with the body of work 
reported in the literature. Further research, particularly with 
paradigms that can appropriately mirror the dynamic nature 
of sport performance, should aim to clarify this.
CONCLUSION
This study is the first to provide support for the TEC as an 
explanation for action anticipation in expert sport performers, 
in so much that the acquisition of sporting expertise promotes 
automatic anticipation of observed actions toward their perceived 
distal effects. That is, automatic anticipation, as measured by 
representational momentum, was greater for experts when there 
was congruency between the observed action and its effect (i.e., 
when the rugby pass was directed toward a teammate). However, 
when the link between the observed action and its effect was 
incongruent (i.e., when the pass was directed away from the 
teammate), experts did not anticipate and as a result were better 
able to meet the task demands, i.e., to accurately recall the 
final position of the passer. The anticipation of novices occurred 
independent of congruency. These findings suggest experts 
automatically anticipate if the perceived action and its effect 
are congruent. Whereas, there was no anticipation in experts 
when actions were incongruent with their learned effects. These 
data also point toward a possible expert-specific ability to inhibit 
automatic anticipation in order to preserve goal-oriented action 
if actions appear incongruent with their learned effects. These 
findings likely have implications for an expert’s ability to accurately 
perceive and respond (or inhibit automatic responses) to deceptive 
actions. That is, if deceptive actions are based on congruent 
action-effect contexts, anticipation to the deception may occur 
automatically in experts. On the other hand, if deceptive actions 
are made that are incongruent with the context’s typical effect, 
experts either do not automatically anticipate or may be  able 
to inhibit automatic anticipation. We  recommend that future 
research explicitly investigate inhibition within the above context 
in order to further examine these proposals.
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